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EXTRAORDINARY

PART II—Section 3

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ELECTION COMMISSION, INDIA

NOTIFICATION

New Delhi, the 30th December 1953

S.R.O. 161.—Whereas the election of Shri Hukam Singh as a member of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Uttar Pradesh, from the Kalsarganj (South) constituency of that Assembly, has been called in question by an Election Petition duly presented under Part VI of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (XLIII of 1951), by Shri Braj Naresh Singh, B.A., LL.B., Vakil, son of Bhaya Jagdeo Singh, Mohalla Akbarpura, Bahrach;

And whereas the Election Tribunal appointed by the Election Commission in pursuance of the provisions of Section 86 of the said Act for the trial of the said Election Petition has, in pursuance of the provisions contained in section 103 of the said Act, sent a copy of its Order to the Commission;

Now, therefore, in pursuance of the provisions of Section 106 of the said Act, the Election Commission hereby publishes the said Order of the Tribunal.

BEFORE THE ELECTION TRIBUNAL AT ALLAHABAD

PRESENT:

Sri V. G. Oak, I.C.S., *Chairman.*

Sri N. N. Mukerji,

Sri Baburam Avasthi, *Members.*

ELECTION PETITION NO. 6 OF 1953

Sri Braj Naresh Singh, *Petitioner.*

Versus

Sri Hukam Singh, *Respondent.*

ORDER

This is an election petition by Sri Braj Naresh Singh challenging the election of Sri Hukam Singh to the U.P. Legislative Assembly from Kalsarganj (South) Constituency, in the district of Bahrach, at the bye-election held on 15th of March, 1953. The petitioner's case is that he and the respondent were the only candidates at the bye-election, and the respondent was declared elected by the Returning Officer on the 18th of March, 1953. The result of the election was published in the U.P. State Gazette (Extra-ordinary) on the 24th of March, 1953. The petitioner questions the election of the respondent on the following grounds. The respondent was disqualified under Article 191 of the Constitution for being chosen as a member of the Legislative Assembly, on account of his holding an office of profit as a Minister in the State Government, even after his election to the Legislative Assembly at the General election in January 1952 had been declared void by the Election Tribunal, Lucknow, by an order dated the 18th of December, 1952, published in the *Gazette of India*

(*Extra-ordinary*) on the 20th of December, 1952. The respondent continued to function as a Minister even after the said declaration of his election being void, although under Article 164(4) of the Constitution he could not, the petitioner contends, continue as a Minister for more than six months with effect from the 20th of May, 1952 (the date of the respondent's original appointment as a Minister) without being a member of the Legislative Assembly, and his continuance as a Minister after the 20th of December, 1952 was *ultra vires* and operated as a disqualification to be a member of the Legislative Assembly; this objection was raised by the petitioner before the Returning Officer on the 10th February, 1953, but was over-ruled by him and the respondent's nomination was accepted by the Returning Officer. This action of the Returning Officer was illegal and has materially affected the result of the bye-election as otherwise the petitioner would have been declared elected being the only other candidate nominated.

The petitioner further contends that the respondent in furtherance of his election took the assistance of a number of Government servants including the District Magistrate of Bahraich, many village headmen, Adalati Panches and village Pradhans: he also appointed a number of such government servants, village headmen, Adalati Panches and village Pradhans as his polling Agents whose names were given in list 'A' attached to the petition. The next contention of the petitioner is that the Return of Election Expenses lodged by the respondent is false in as much as the expenses incurred by the Congress organisation on his behalf have been wholly omitted, and the equivalent of the service rendered to the respondent by the jeep and truck provided to him by the proprietors of Jarwal Road Sugar Mills, has been omitted and the respondents expenses actually incurred exceeded the maximum limit of Rs. 8,000. The petitioner further contends that the respondent and his agent carried on propaganda against the personal character and conduct of the petitioner. One Bhagwan Bux Misra brought forward a handbill calumnising the petitioner. The details of this pamphlet are given in list 'B' attached to the petition. The further contention of the petitioner in the petition is that the respondent and his agents brought out handbills and posters without the names of printer and publisher, in furtherance of the respondent's election. The details were given in list 'C'. The petitioner, therefore, prayed that the election of the respondent be declared void and the petitioner be declared elected a member of the U.P. Legislative Assembly from the Kaisarganj (South) Constituency in the district of Bahraich.

The respondent in his written statement admitted many of the facts alleged in the petition but did not admit the facts given in paragraph (6) of the petition which were made the basis of the petitioner's claim. In the Additional pleas the respondent asserts that he was never disqualified under Article 191 of the Constitution, that the finding of the Election Tribunal, Lucknow declaring the election of the respondent at the General Election in January, 1952, was published in the U.P. State Gazette (Extraordinary) on the 20th December 1952 and it was only after the publication that the order of the Election Tribunal became operative; that the said order of the Election Tribunal could not have retrospective effect in as much as the entire scheme of the Representation of People Act, 1951 indicated otherwise; that it was only for a period of nearly three months from the 20th of December, 1952 to the 24th of March, 1953, that the respondent was not a member of the Legislative Assembly and the six months period under Article 164(4) of the Constitution should be calculated from the 20th December, 1952 and not from the 20th of May, 1952, when he was appointed Minister. Hence, the stage never reached when the respondent remained a Minister for more than six months and so he was not disqualified on the dates of his nomination and the election now in question, as he was successful in the bye-election which took place on the 15th of March, 1953, was declared elected by the Returning Officer on the 18th of March, 1953, and the declaration of his election was published in the U. P. State Gazette, dated the 24th of March, 1953. Hence, the respondent contends, at no stage could it be said that he had illegally held the office of a Minister and the Returning Officer's order, dated 10th February 1953 accepting his nomination was valid and not open to question. The respondent denied that he took any help from any government servants or headmen, Pradhans etc.

On these pleadings the following issues were framed:

ISSUES

1. Whether the respondent was disqualified for election for reasons given in clause (a) of paragraph (6) of the petition?

Was respondent's nomination paper improperly accepted?

2. Did the District Magistrate of Bahraich attend the election meeting mentioned in clause (c) of paragraph (6) of the petition? If so, its effect?

Is this charge not maintainable due to the absence of a list of particulars?

3. Whether the persons mentioned in List A are Panches, Sarpanches, Mukhias or Pradhans as alleged?

Did they work as polling agents for the respondent?

Whether these persons are Government Servants for purposes of section 123(8), R.P. Act, 1951?

Did the respondent act in good faith in employing these persons?

4. Were the jeep and the truck employed for the respondent as mentioned in clause (d) of paragraph (6) of the petition?

Is this charge not maintainable due to absence of a list of particulars?

5. Did the respondent take precautions as mentioned in paragraph (24) of the written statement? If so, its result?

6. To what relief, if any, is the petitioner entitled?

None of the parties produced any oral evidence.

FINDINGS

Issue No. 1.—The facts are admitted, so far as issue No. 1 is concerned. The respondent was declared to have been elected from the Constituency in question as a result of the General Election held in January, 1952. The respondent assumed charge as a Minister in the U.P. Government on 20th May 1952. Sri Brij Naresh Singh filed an election petition challenging the election of Sri Hukam Singh as a result of the General Election. His election petition was allowed by the Election Tribunal, Lucknow, on 18th December, 1952. That decision was published in the Gazette of India and in the U.P. Gazette on 20th December 1952. Although the Election Tribunal, Lucknow, declared the election held on 22nd January 1952 void, the respondent continued as a Minister after 20th December 1952 at least up to August, 1953.

The first point for consideration is whether as a result of the decision of the Election Tribunal, Lucknow, the respondent's election in 1952 was void *ab initio* as alleged by the petitioner, or only with effect from the 20th of December, 1952, as pressed on behalf of the respondent. Section 107, R.P. Act, 1951 states: "An order of the Tribunal under section 98 or section 99 shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette of India under section 106". In the present case the judgment of the Election Tribunal, Lucknow, was pronounced on 18th December 1952. The decision was published in the Gazette of India, dated 20th December 1952. So, under section 107, R.P. Act, 1951, the order of the Election Tribunal, Lucknow, could not take effect until 20th December 1952. The question, however, remains whether the publication made on 20th December 1952 had retrospective effect.

Sri Shiva Prasad Sinha appearing for the respondent referred to "Keshavan v. State of Bombay" (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 128). In that case their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that, every statute is *prima facie* prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. The question for consideration in Keshavan's case was whether Article 13 of the Constitution had retrospective operation. The point under consideration in the present case is slightly different. The question is whether the order of the Election Tribunal pronounced on 18th December 1952 and published in the Gazette on 20th December 1952 had retrospective operation.

When a civil court grants a declaration that a certain transaction is void, the declaration generally means that the transaction is bad in law for all purposes. When a court passes a decree declaring that a marriage is a nullity, there is a declaration that the marriage was void *ab initio*. Children born from such a union are illegitimate. It is, however, open to the Legislature to provide that a certain transaction or proceeding shall be partly valid and partly invalid.

Clause (b) of Article 329 of the Constitution lays down that, "No election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition.....". It is true that the marginal note to Article 329 is "Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters." It may be that the main idea underlying article 329 was to oust jurisdiction of civil courts to interfere in electoral matters. But Article 329(b) lays down in clear terms that, an election shall not be called in question except by an election petition. To the same effect is section 80, R.P. Act, 1951: "No election shall be called in question except by an election petition...." Article 329 of the Constitution and section 80, R.P. Act, 1951, require that, an election has to be treated as a valid proceeding, unless such election is declared void by an

Election Tribunal. In other words, an election to the Legislature of a State is only voidable, and not altogether void.

Sri Harish Chandra Sharma appearing for the petitioner drew our attention to Article 189 of the Constitution. Article 189(2) lays down that, "any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall be valid notwithstanding that it is discovered subsequently that some person who was not entitled so to do sat or voted or otherwise took part in the proceedings." Article 189(2) thus declares that even if the election of a person is set aside by an Election Tribunal, the part taken by such person in the Legislature has to be treated as valid. Sri Sharma argued that this Article supports his contention that the election is otherwise void, as R.P. Act, 1951 does not contain any provision corresponding to Article 189(2) of the Constitution.

Section 98, R.P. Act, 1951 provides for four different forms for the decision of an Election Tribunal. Clause (d) of section 98 provides for an order declaring the election to be wholly void. Similarly, section 100(1), R.P. Act, 1951, lays down that, under certain circumstances, the Tribunal shall declare the election to be wholly void. The declaration made by the Election Tribunal, Lucknow, on 18th December 1952 was that, the election held on 22nd January 1952 was wholly void.

What is the effect of this order of 18th December 1952 is the chief point of dispute between the parties. It is contended for the petitioner that the use of the word "void" in the said order itself and in sections 98 and 100(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951, makes it clear that the original election of the respondent was altogether void i.e., void *ab initio*. In other words the order had a retrospective effect. It is on the other hand contended for the respondent that the said order had no such effect, and that it took effect from the date of its publication, the 20th of December, 1952.

Sri Harish Chandra Sharma appearing for the petitioner argues that sections 98 and 100 use the word "void" and "wholly void" and the order of the Lucknow Tribunal, dated 18th December 1952 declared first election of the respondent to be "void", hence it must be taken that there was no election at all in the eye of law and so no declaration of the respondent's election. The six months' period under Article 164(4) he contends, must run from 20th May 1952 when the respondent was appointed Minister by the Governor and it lasted till 20th November 1952 and the period after this last date is not covered by Article 164(4). As a consequence the respondent was not a Minister on the dates of nomination for the bye election, and the poll and the declaration of the result thereof. His argument at the first sight seemed plausible. The reply of Sri Shiva Prasad Sinha appearing for the respondent was that (1) the word "void" is sometimes used in legislative enactments for the word "voidable", as held by courts, and (2) if the word "void" is taken in its strict literal sense, then it leads to absurdity, as on that view the respondent ceased to be a Minister from 21st November 1952 without any one being aware of it, for the declaration of the Lucknow Tribunal came about a month later on 18th December 1952. Hence, if two constructions of a word are possible, then that construction should be rejected which leads to an absurdity and therefore, the word "void" in sections 98 and 100(1) and the Lucknow Tribunal's order, dated 18th December 1952 should be interpreted in the sense of "voidable". We do not want to question the soundness of this rule of interpretation.

We are, however, of opinion that the respondent's contention taken as a whole is not correct, and it does not meet the difficulty appearing from the use of the word "void" in section 98 and 100, and we think that the word "void" has been used, as we shall presently show, correctly and intentionally in its literal sense of nullity and not in the sense of "voidable".

Apart from the above reason, Sri Shiva Prasad Sinha could not give any reason why the election of the respondent at the General Election of January, 1952 should be deemed voidable and not void. But we have come to the conclusion that there is an undoubtable and unquestionable reason for holding that the said election was only voidable and not void *ab initio* though it was declared "wholly void" under section 100(1), R.P. Act, 1951, by the Lucknow Tribunal.

It appears to us that the whole thing turns upon the decision whether an election which can be set aside and which has been actually set aside under section 100(1) R.P. Act, 1951, was void or only voidable. In the former case, it will take effect from the very beginning, for, a transaction which is void in law is not deemed to have existed at all. If on the other hand, such an election as can be set aside is only voidable at the option of the defeated party, then it remained valid till it was avoided, for it was open to the defeated party not to challenge it at all, in which case it would have remained valid and would not have any effect on the successful party. Hence we have to consider this point rather in detail.

"The distinction between 'void' and 'voidable' transactions is a fundamental one, though it is often" [says Pollock in his book on the 'Principles of Contract', 10th (1936) Edition], "obscure by carelessness of language. An agreement or other act which is void, has from the beginning no legal effect at all, save in so far as any party to it incur penal consequences, as may happen where a special prohibitive law, both makes the act void and imposes a penalty. Otherwise no person's rights whether he be a party or a stranger, are effected. A voidable act, on the contrary, takes its full and proper legal effect unless and until it is disputed and set aside by some person entitled so to do". In Mosley and Whiteley's Law Dictionary, the distinction between 'void' and 'voidable' is given thus: "A transaction is said to be void when it is a mere nullity and incapable of confirmation; whereas a voidable transaction is one which may be either avoided or confirmed by matter arising *ex-post facto*". And the author relies for this statement on Stephens' "Commentaries". The Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines these words thus: "Section 2(g)—An agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void, (i) an agreement which is enforceable by law at the option of one or more of the parties thereto, but not at the option of the other or others, is a voidable contract.

It is true that in the present case no contract is in dispute, but the same distinction between a void transaction and a voidable one runs in every branch of law.

As already observed, Article 329(2) of the Constitution and Section 80 of the R.P. Act, 1951 lay down that no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either Houses of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for, by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature; and the law contemplated here has been made by the Central Legislature as the Representation of People Act, 1951. This mandate of the Constitution clearly shows that an election which can be avoided under the R.P. Act, 1951 is only voidable and not absolutely void, but the use of the word "void" in sections 98 and 100(1) of R.P. Act 1951 causes some difficulty, and we have to see whether this use of the word "void" and "wholly void" in Section 100 R.P. Act, 1951 militates against such an election being voidable only. Section 98 says: "at the conclusion of the trial of an election petition the Tribunal shall make an order.... (b) declaring the election of the returned candidate to be void; or..... (d) declaring the election to be wholly void." Similarly Section 100 lays down in sub-section (1): "if the Tribunal is of opinion..... (c) that the result of the election has been materially effected by the improper acceptance or rejection of any nomination, the Tribunal shall declare the election to be *wholly void*". (We may observe here that this was, what was declared by the Lucknow Tribunal on 18th December 1952).

Section 100 Sub-section (2) speaks: "..... if the Tribunal is of opinion..... the Tribunal shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void, (3) if in the opinion of the Tribunal the Tribunal may decide that the election of the returned candidate is not void."

Thus we see that the word "void" occurs where an election is declared void. That is, the Act in these sections speaks of the Tribunal's ultimate order and so the word "voidable" could not be used in these sections. A transaction which is voidable is valid till it is avoided in due process of law and when the party entitled sets the law in motion for the purpose of avoiding a voidable transaction and when the court upholds his contention, it uses the word "void" in its order or decree and not "voidable". A court cannot say "I declare the contract or transaction to be voidable", for on the date of the declaration by the court it was no longer voidable having already been avoided by the party entitled. In a suit for declaration regarding a voidable contract or transaction or alienation the plaintiff always prays "Please declare it to be void". [See the Specific Reliefs Act Section 42, illustration (c), which contemplates a declaration in a reversioner's suit to set aside an alienation made by a widow without legal necessity which is only voidable). See 'Obala Kondama Naicker Ayyan *versus* Kandasamy Goundar' (1923) 51 Indian Appeals 145 (at pp. 151—3) 47 Mad. 181 22 Allahabad Law Journal 16.

In Mogha's Pleadings, 1951 edition, pp. 385-6, Forms of Plaints Nos. 30, 31 and 32, are the plaints for avoiding voidable transactions, i.e. contracts and alienations on account of coercion, fraud, undue influence etc., which are only voidable under the Contract Act, Sections 19 and 19-A. In every one of them the relief sought is to declare the transaction to be void (not voidable).

In a case where the relief claimed is only a declaration (as in election petitions) the operative part of the judgment cannot possibly use the word "voidable" and must use the word "void"; though the court may say in the body of its judgment that the transaction impeached was voidable.

Moreover, there is the high authority of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for saying that a voidable contract when avoided "becomes void" and then must be treated as void, (vide *Satgur Prasad versus Har Narain, I.L.R. 7 Lucknow 64—1932 Allahabad Law Journal 297—A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 89*).

Here the transaction in dispute was only voidable and so was sought to be avoided by a suit by the person entitled, and the Privy Council held that when the court finds a transaction to be voidable then it "becomes void", within the meaning of Section 65 of the Contract Act and they applied the provisions of the said section to the case. In plain language this ruling lays down that after the party entitled to avoid a voidable transaction moves to set it aside, the transaction is no longer voidable but becomes void.

In the light of these considerations we may proceed to interpret section 107 R.P. Act 1951. This section lays down that, an order of the Tribunal shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette of India under section 106. It is a little difficult to understand the idea underlying section 107. Under the Government of India (Provincial Elections) Corrupt Practices and Election Petitions Order, 1936, Commissioners were appointed for making inquiries into election petitions. Election Commissioners submitted a report to the Governor. The Governor had to issue orders in accordance with the report of Election Commissioners. In England Election Judges are required to submit their report to the Speaker of the House of Commons. Under Section 103 R.P. Act 1951, the Tribunal after announcing orders under sections 98 and 99 has to send a copy thereof to the Election Commission. Under Section 106, the Election Commission causes the order to be published in the Gazette of India and the Official Gazette of the State concerned. Section 107 lays down that the orders take effect only on such publication. Thus, the provisions of sections 103, 106 and 107 R.P. Act, 1951 are on the lines of the previous election law in India and the present election law in England.

Under section 107 an order of the Tribunal shall not take effect until it is published in the Gazette of India. Section 107 is capable of two interpretations. According to the first interpretation section 107 merely postpones the operation of the order of the Tribunal by a short interval (between the date of delivery of the order and the date of publication in the Gazette). In the present case the order of the Election Tribunal, Lucknow, was delivered on 18th December 1952. The order was published in the Gazette of India on 20th December 1952. Thus, according to the first interpretation the only effect of section 107 was that instead of 18th December 1952 the order took effect on 20th December 1952. There was little point in making a provision, which merely causes a delay of two days in the operation of the order. According to the second interpretation of Section 107 the publication in the Gazette of India has no retrospective effect. The words, "an order of the Tribunal shall not take effect until" are equivalent to the expression "an order of the Tribunal shall have no effect until". Bearing in mind the basic principle that an election is only voidable and not void, the second interpretation of Section 107 R.P. Act, 1951 appears more plausible.

So, in our opinion the order, dated 18th December 1952 had no legal effect until 20th December 1952. The election held on 22nd January 1952 was valid upto 19th December 1952. The election was invalid with effect from 20th December 1952.

Sri Sharma relied upon Articles 164 and 191 of the Constitution in support of his contention that, the respondent was disqualified for membership of U.P. Legislative Assembly. Article 164(4) of the Constitution states: "A Minister who, for any period of six consecutive months, is not a member of the Legislature of the State shall, at the expiration of that period, cease to be a Minister." It was urged for the petitioner that, 'the election held on 22nd January 1952 was wholly void. The respondent worked as a Minister from 20th May 1952 till 18th March 1953 although he was not a member of the Legislature during this period. This period exceeded six months. Thus the respondent violated Article 164(4) of the Constitution.' But we have held that the respondent's election as a member of the U.P. Legislative Assembly during the General Election was valid upto 19th December 1952. That election became invalid with effect from 20th December 1952 only. On 18th March 1953 the respondent was declared elected in the bye election. Thus it was only for a period of about three months that the respondent worked as a Minister, although he was not a member of the Legislature. It has not been shown that, the respondent worked as a Minister for the period of six consecutive months, although he was not a member of the Legislature. There was, therefore, no violation of Article 164(4) of the Constitution.

Lastly, we have to consider Article 191 of the Constitution. Article 191 states: "(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member

of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of State (a) if he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State specified in the First Schedule. (2) For the purposes of this Article, a person shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State specified in the First Schedule by reason only that he is a Minister either for the Union or for such State."

It will be noticed that sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 191 lays down a rule that a holder of an office of profit shall be disqualified for membership while clause (2) of Article 191 lays down an exception to that rule. We have to consider whether the respondents case falls under the general rule or under the exception. It was conceded by the respondent's counsel in August 1953, that the respondent worked as a Minister throughout the period from May, 1953 to August 1953. It was also conceded that he was drawing the salary attached to this office. The respondent worked as a Minister, and drew his salary both on the date of the nomination and the date of polling.

The Uttar Pradesh is one of the States specified in the First Schedule of the Constitution. At the material time the respondent held the post of a Minister in Uttar Pradesh. Under clause (2) of Article 191, the respondent shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of U.P. by reason only that he was a Minister in U.P. Government. So, the respondent was not hit by the prohibition contained in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 191 of the Constitution. The respondent was not disqualified for membership of U.P. Legislative Assembly.

We, therefore, hold that the respondent was not disqualified for election, and that his nomination paper was properly accepted by the Returning Officer.

Issue No. 2.—The petitioner did not press this issue. So the first part of issue No. 2 is decided against the petitioner. Part 2 of this issue does not arise. It is not necessary to discuss part 3 of this issue.

Issue No. 3.—The petitioner did not press this issue. So parts 1, 2 and 3 of issue No. 3 are decided against the petitioner. It is not now necessary to discuss part 4 of issue No. 3.

Issue No. 4.—This issue was not pressed by the petitioner. Part 1 of issue No. 4 is decided against the petitioner. It is unnecessary to discuss part 2 of the issue No. 4.

Issue No. 5.—The respondent did not adduce any evidence on this issue. Part 1 of issue No. 5 is decided against the respondent. Part 2 of the issue does not arise.

Issue No. 6.—The petitioner pressed issue No. 1 only. On that issue he has failed. So the election petition must be dismissed. The petitioner should be ordered to pay the respondent's costs, which we assess at Rs. 250.

ORDER

The election petition is dismissed. We declare that no corrupt or illegal practice has been proved against the respondent. The petitioner shall pay the respondent Rs. 250 as costs. The petitioner shall be entitled to obtain a refund of the balance of Rs. 750 from his security deposit of Rs. 1,000.

(Sd.) V. G. OAK, I.C.S., Chairman.

(Sd.) N. N. MUKERJI, Member.

(Sd.) BABU RAM AVASTHI, Member.

The 17th December, 1953.

* In this Election Petition Sri Harish Chandra Sharma Advocate represented the petitioner while the respondent was represented by Sarvasri R. N. Basu, Balram Lal Srivastava, S. P. Sinha, S. N. Sinha, R. N. Shukla, M. P. Shukla and others.

(Sd.) V. G. OAK, I.C.S., Chairman.

[No. 82/6/53/9447.]

By Order,

P. R. KRISHNAMURTHY, Asstt. Secy.

